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ABSTRACT
The question “why transplanted Western democracy in Southeast Asia could not 
thrive as intended” has yet to be answered. A possible answer to the question could 
be found in the dynamics of cultural encounter between the traditional Southeast 
Asian society and Western democracy. The case of the Muslim province of Lanao 
del Sur in the Philippines provides us an understanding how Western democratic 
institutions were translated and localised. The adaptation of Western democracy 
meant to restructure the political boundaries and especially for the Muslim Maranao 
to integrate into the bigger Christian dominated polity. Although the system of 
authority changed from the traditional to the so-called legal one, the traditional 
conception of social relations and authority still shape the Maranao politics. Western 
democratic institutions are observed only superficially. And the transformed Western 
democracy caused conflicts and armed struggle among the locals.
Keywords: The Philippines, Maranao politics, western democracy, localisation of 
democracy, hybridisation of democracy
INTRODUCTION
Southeast Asian countries, save for Thailand, experienced long periods of 
Western colonisation. During these times, various aspects of Western ideology 
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and institutions such as individualism, capitalism and the rule of law were 
applied in the region. These became the bedrock for the modern political system 
of democracy, which began expanding in some Southeast Asian countries after 
achieving independence from the colonial rule. In the case of the Philippines, 
however, the Americans, who took over the Philippines from the Spanish in 
1898, tried to transplant democracy through education and political tutelage 
during its occupation of the islands. It was only during the American colonial 
period that the entire Philippine archipelago came into being as one entity. 
During the Spanish colonial period of 1565 to 1898, the Muslim society in 
the Philippine Mindanao islands was not entirely subjugated. The ceaseless 
military campaign to conquer Muslim communities made the region isolated 
from the outside world for centuries. When the Americans came to control 
the area, the Muslims were seen to have been able to maintain and safeguard 
its old traditions, which were little tainted by Western influences. Philippine 
Muslim society then provides a valuable case where the dynamics of cultural 
encounter between the traditional Southeast Asian society and Western 
democracy may be observed. This study aims to understand how Western 
democratic institutions were translated and localised in a Muslim province of 
the Philippines, and focuses specifically on the province of Lanao del Sur in 
Mindanao.
The Muslims in the Philippines are composed of several ethno-linguistic 
groups or societies, which greatly differ from each other in history, culture, 
and language. Local peoples in the region used ethnic designators, such as 
Tausug, Magindanao, and Maranao to label themselves (Tan 1984: 12). Unlike 
the other two major ethnic groups, the Maranao of Lanao have not reached 
the degree of political centralisation by a strong sultanate. Their proximity 
to the lake gives them their name Maranao, which means “lake dwellers” or 
people residing in or within the vicinity of the lake (Barcenas 2000: 128). The 
Maranao pre-Islamic tradition is believed to be similar to the general model 
of Philippine society, the barangay system (Mednick 1975: 363; Saber 1967: 
67). Earlier writers appropriately described Lanao as “the land of 1001 sultans 
and datus” for depending on the specific structural level one refers to, one 
does come up with countless sultans or datus (Baradas 1973: 278). 
Today, the home province of the ethnic Maranao is Lanao del Sur, 
which is part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) of 
the Philippines. Lanao del Sur has a population of 1,045,429 (2015 census) 
and consists of 1,159 barangays, 39 municipalities, and 1 component city, the 
Islamic City of Marawi, the provincial capital. Lanao del Sur is known as the 
poorest province of the whole country, which also has the highest prevalence 
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cases of rido (clan conflict) (Adam and Boer 2015: 12, 18). As a province of 
the Philippines, Lanao del Sur follows the democratic system of governance, 
and merits our examination, in order to understand the hybrid characteristics 
of democracy in the contemporary Southeast Asia.
In known literatures of Southeast Asian studies, the traditional polity 
of Southeast Asia has been described by way of concepts such as the mandala 
(Wolters 1982), galactic polity (Tambiah 1976), and the negara (Geertz 1980). 
The fluid network or alliance system among semi-autonomous localities 
was a common feature of the polity, roughly based on Hindu cosmology. 
The state functions as a ruling body quite different from the old Chinese or 
Western kingdoms which control peoples and territories through a centralised 
government. In Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (1980), 
Geertz argues that the Negara was not a mechanism for extracting surpluses 
from the peasantry nor an administrative tool for the coercive execution 
of policy, but a continuing tableau vivant of Bali’s cosmologically-based 
conceptions of hierarchy. He also concludes that this model may be extended 
to most of the “Indic” states of ancient Southeast Asia and provides an essential 
corrective to the overly coercive-administrative view of the state dominant in 
Western political theory since the 16th century. Even though Islam has been 
a dominant religion among the Maranao since its coming to the region in the 
17th century, the type of Maranao polity was closer to Geertz’ Negara than 
that of Arabian sultanate.
There are a number of studies about the changes of Philippine political 
system after the imposition of Western democratic institutions. For a broad 
perspective, Hutchcroft’s Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial 
Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 
1900–1913 (2000) explains the state characteristics that American colonisers 
introduced in the Philippines. He argues that American colonisers tried 
to obtain the support of the local elites rather than to implement a reform 
program without their help. This policy orientation was executed through 
extensive systems of patronage, and resulted in promoting local autonomy 
at the expense of central authority. A study of the early Philippine elections 
by Lande and Cigler, Competition and Turnover in Philippine Congressional 
Elections, 1907–1969 (1979), reveals that the Philippine election as the 
most important democratic institution modelled after the American system. 
However, it employed informal political structures and responded to voter 
behaviour in a manner fundamentally different from that of the Americans. The 
above mentioned two studies attest that the Western democratic system was 
suited to local conditions for the convenience of the colonial administration.
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In Lanao local context, and with consideration of modernisation 
theory, Saber deals with the issue of the contrasting traditional and modern 
authority systems in his dissertation The Transition from a Traditional to a 
Legal Authority System: A Philippine Case (1967). He provides a complete 
picture of the transformation of traditional authority to legal authority in the 
Maranao society. He argues that the notion of “transition” does not mean a 
complete change of the traditional authority system. In practice, traditional 
authorities and legal laws are seen as moving toward the integration of some 
of their elements to provide a new pattern of normative control. However, he 
also admits that modern authority increasingly gains wider internal ground in 
the changing social system of the Maranao, and it coincides with the level of 
urbanisation. Two studies, Mednick’s Sultans and Mayors: The Relation of a 
National to an Indigenous Political System (1975) and Warriner’s Traditional 
Authority and the Modern State: The Case of the Maranao (1975) explain 
how traditional elites reestablish political status and exploit new institutions. 
Mednick argues that the national political system is not in conflict with the 
indigenous system because, on the local level, the roles of mayors and sultans 
are largely compatible. The practice of universal suffrage calls into being a new 
powerful figure, the sultan-mayor who possesses both traditional and modern 
sources of power. Meanwhile, Warriner’s study reveals how locals exploit 
newly-introduced modern institutions for preserving traditional powers and 
relationships. The aforementioned three studies are relevant in understanding 
the current practice of democratic institutions in Maranao society. The authors, 
however, only described the outward changes, and not the growing conflicting 
elements from within. The armed rebellion emerging from discrimination and 
marginalisation define anti-Westernisation movements and prove the failure 
of the Western democratic system in the region. 
A recent study by Adam and Boer, Conflict Mediation and Traditional 
Authority in the Province of Lanao del Sur, Mindanao (2015), suggests the 
positive role of traditional authority in solving local conflicts. Adam and Boer 
argue that in Lanao del Sur, formal state structures are mediated through kin-
based institutions, hereby shaping specific hybrid institutions. However, they 
argue, these hybrid institutions or other informal forms of public authority are 
not necessarily perceived as something problematic, but more pragmatic. The 
main advantage of these hybrid institutions is that they have historically and 
organically grown and therefore have strong social embeddedness, thereby 
generating a sense of continuity, trust, and order. Adam and Boer’s study simply 
confirms some institutionalists’ arguments, like institutional “recombination” 
by Scott (2001) and the “path-dependence” of institutional change by North 
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(1990), and prescribes the positive role of traditional elements for solving the 
persisting social conflicts. 
Today, the question why transplanted Western democracy in Southeast 
Asia, including the Philippines, could not thrive as intended, still remains. It 
may be an exaggeration to say that there has been no changes in the Philippine 
and Maranao democracy ever since its introduction. The collection of articles 
on the Philippines edited by Yuko Kasuya and Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, The 
Politics of Change in the Philippines (2010), attests that the accumulated 
political experience and the socio-economic changes gradually impact the 
various aspects of the Philippine democracy. However, the popular labels 
for Philippine democracy such as “cacique democracy” (Anderson 1988), 
“electoral democracy” (Diamond 2002), “low quality democracy” (Case 
1998), and “low intensity democracy” (Gills and Rocamora 1992) are still 
relevant. Major keywords in articulating Philippine politics include “patron-
client,” “bossism,” “horse trade,” etc., quite different from conventional 
Western democracy. The case of Lanao del Sur may not be representative of 
the current status of Southeast Asian democracy, but it could provide a new 
angle in understanding how Western democracy was adapted and practiced in 
the cultural context of Southeast Asia.
As a modern political system, the representative democracy was born 
and evolved in the course of struggle over the sovereign power between the 
autocratic king and the people in the Western civilisation, especially in the UK, 
France, and the US. After defeating the absolute power of the king, the people 
began to concern about the representation of the people and the prevention of 
the rise of any absolute power. These concerns have translated into the Western 
democratic principles and institutions such as civil rights, election and the rule 
of law. Although no clear consensus on the definition of democracy exists 
yet, some characteristics such as legal equality, political freedom and the rule 
of law have been identified as the indispensable elements (O’Donnell 2005). 
Larry Diamond (2009) defined democracy in two ways, “Thin” democracy 
as a procedural definition and “Thick” democracy as a substantive definition. 
“Thin” democracy is, basically, based on the conduct of elections. “Thick” 
democracy is elections plus other elements such as the various spheres of 
freedom and rule of law as well as a vibrant civil society. Diamond assumes 
that thick democracy is the logical and preferred outcome of thin democracy. 
The thick democracy could be the ideal type of Western “liberal” democracy, 
and according to Youngs (2015), it is a goal to achieve by the democrats in all 
regions of the world.
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However, due to the analytical difficulties of substantive democracy, 
scholars tend to give more emphasis on the procedural definition of democracy 
(Huntington 1991; Schumpeter 1942). The periodic conduct of free elections 
became the most important criterion to judge whether a political system is 
democracy or non-democracy. Such minimum definition of democracy caused 
the emergence of various types of democracy aside from Western “liberal” 
democracy. As an example, scholars called the unique characteristics of 
Asian democracy as “Asian-style or Asian Model of democracy” (Benjamin 
2007; Hewison 1999; Neher 1994). Even though many Asian countries adopt 
the basic institutions of Western democracy, the way of conducting them is 
different depending on their own standpoints. A number of reasons has been 
applied to explain why the differences occur.
In this study, two most important elements of Western 
democracyelection and the rule of lawwere taken into account to explain 
the Maranao style of democracy. Election as a means to create a legal authority 
is an indispensable element in a democratic system. And the rule of law is 
related to the state capability to control the social issues, which is not only to 
keep the society safe, but also to make possible elections free and fair and to set 
the constitutional limit of the elected power (Maravall and Przeworski 2003). 
Any types of political system without these two elements could not claim to 
be a democracy. Apparently transplanting democracy means the introduction 
of these two institutions to a non-democratic society.
The analysis in this study mainly relied on existing documents and 
publications, as well as extensive interviews with people from the locality. The 
interviews were conducted during several field researches in Lanao del Sur and 
Manila from 2013 to 2016. The interviewees constitute various individuals, 
including intellectuals, politicians, datus and sultans, etc. The following 
section, Section Two, covers the historical background of the province of 
Lanao del Sur. Meanwhile, Section Three deals with the transformation of 
Western democratic institutions in Lanao del Sur and analyses the electoral 
practices and adherence to the rule of law. The last section offers a summary 
and conclusion. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROVINCE OF 
LANAO DEL SUR
The political set-up of the pre-Islamic Philippines was based on the barangay 
system or datuship. Datuship was somewhat feudal-type of social organisation 
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where members were related to one another by kinship rather than political 
and economic ties. The different datuships, therefore, maintained political 
independence, although interdependence existed among them because of 
internal trade and necessary alliances against common enemies (Abdulrachman 
and Makol 2013: 25). The coming of Islam brought a new political institution, 
the sultanate. According to Filipino historian Cesar Majul, the Philippines 
began to adopt Islam in the early 14th century, with the Maranaos becoming 
Islamised in the early 17th century (Majul 1971: 56–78). 
The introduction of the sultanate hastened the state process by providing 
a super-structure over the scattered datuships. This was true for Sulu and 
Magindanao area,1 but not Lanao. The system of sultanate in Lanao thrived 
alongside pre-Islamic social structure. The differences could be noted by way 
of topography. The Lanao region embraced Lake Lanao, which irrigates rich 
rice paddy land around it, and is surrounded by fertile upland areas. Such 
topography provides reliable subsistence and refuge from domination. Lake 
Lanao itself allows free movement in all boundaries, which makes political 
and economic dominance quite impossible (Bentley 1984: 651). Maranao 
polity resembled commonly found elements in traditional Southeast Asia. It 
is characterised by kinship ties of collectivism; sports a hierarchical structure, 
though not bureaucratic but consultative; is led by “big men”; has a mandala-
style government where chiefs dominate the less powerful, among others 
(Abdulrachman and Makol 2013: 24). 
The traditional Maranao society as a whole is called pat a pengampong 
(state), and it divided territorially four sub-pengampongs (sub-states), namely 
Bayabao, Masiu, Unayan, and Baloi. In terms of governing structure, the 
four sub-pengampongs are coequal in power and prestige. They are bound 
together in a sort of confederation or alliance, governed by an ancient order 
or law defining the relationship among communities and their members. The 
four sub-pengampongs have their own sub-units of suko (district), inged 
(township), and agama (village community). Each level of organisation from 
a sub-pengampong to an agama is governed by a pelokelokesen (council of 
elders), representing the interests of people. The elders who enforce authority 
function as a group with a not so clearly delineated executive, legislative, and 
judicial authorities. In general, interpersonal and interpositional connections 
or relations operate in different situations (Saber 1967: 72, 178). 
Today, the four sub-pengampongs consists of 9 suko and 43 inged. 
According to Jamel Cayamodin, it is at the inged level where one can find 
political units with inheritable titles such as datu and sultan, etc. There are two 
categorical rankings of ingedthe pegawidan (supported or superordinate), 
IJAPS, Vol. 14, No. 1, 107–132, 2018 Transforming Western Democracy
114
of which there are 15 sultans; and the pegawid (supporting or subordinate), 
of which there are 28 sultans (Cayamodin 2013: 80). The ingod is further 
subdivided into sectors, called agama,2 and again into bangon, the level of 
significant kin interaction (Baradas 1973: 275). According to Samuel Tan, the 
social organisation of Filipino Muslim societies was non-Islamic and followed 
the matrix of social organisations throughout the Philippine archipelago. It 
was also established in insular Southeast Asia but not in the rest of the Islamic 
world (Tan 1984: 11). 
The authority system of traditional Maranao society is based on titular 
succession. If a datu or sultan dies, the members of one bangensa (community) 
would hold consultations to determine the legitimate successor to the throne 
(Cayamodin 2007: 75). The succession issue is one of the most frequent 
reasons for the clan conflicts, or the so-called rido (Adam and Boer 2015). The 
immediate kin group’s active role and interest in supporting the claimant rest 
on the fact that they too would benefit immensely when a member of the clan 
acquires the title. The individual’s validated rank, evidenced by the holding of 
a title, affects the ranks of all his relatives, as this shapes the way they are to 
be perceived by the rest of the villagers (Baradas 1973: 277). 
When it comes to the rule of law, traditional Maranao relied on 
indigenous law such as taritib and igma, as well as Islamic Law. According to 
Moctar Matuan, the indigenous laws are themselves continuously influenced 
by Islamic Law. In fact, the word taritib and igma are said to have been 
adopted from two original Arabic terms: tartib and ijma. The former means 
arrangement or order while the latter refers to the consensus of jurists about a 
question of law at a particular point in history (Matuan 2007: 73).
Traditional Maranao society began to change under the American 
colonial rule, brought about by the Treaty of Paris of 1898. During the entire 
period of Spanish colonial rule, traditional Maranao society was relatively 
independent and isolated from the rest of the Philippines due to the sustained 
armed struggle against the Spanish (Benitez 1969: 10). The American military 
campaigns in Lanao began in 1903 and extended to 1906. The organisation of 
the Moro Province in 1903 was the first step to instituting American sovereignty 
in the Muslim world (Tan 1984: 67). 
Political, social, and economic changes began in Lanao. Provincial and 
district institutions were created and the public school system was introduced; 
an American-inspired judicial system was put up alongside the imposition of 
the cedula (head tax). Christians were encouraged to migrate to Muslim lands 
and slavery was abolished (Che Man 1990: 23, 47). The new administrative 
structure, with its national, provincial, city, municipality, and barrio units, 
IJAPS, Vol. 14, No. 1, 107–132, 2018 Dong-Yeob Kim
115
superimposed upon the social and territorial jurisdiction of the pengampong. 
The municipal board is responsible to the provincial board, and the mayor is 
responsible to the provincial governor. This hierarchical system of authority is 
different from that of the one followed by the “elders” who were not answerable 
to any superior external authority and non-existing central authority of the 
Pangampong (Benitez 1969: 14; Saber 1967: 102).
Under the colonial governmental organisation, the Department of 
Mindanao and Sulu replaced the special military administration of the Moro 
Province in 1914. It was again replaced by the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes 
in 1916, through the enforcement of the Jones Law.3 The Bureau was abolished 
in 1930, and was replaced by the Commission for Mindanao and Sulu, as 
provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 75. It was an advisory agency to the 
national government, which dealt with the direct management of Muslim 
affairs under the Commonwealth (1935–1946)4 (Barcenas 2000: 139; Saber 
1967: 76).
The policies adopted by the Commonwealth government included 
features which adversely affected the traditional authority system of the 
Maranao. For one, the government refused to recognise traditional titles. 
The policy of non-recognition of traditional authority was expressed in a 
memorandum by President Manuel L. Quezon, where he underscored the 
weakness in the policy adopted by the government in recognising datus by 
making them ex-officio officials of the government. This policy, according 
to Quezon, must be stopped and changed radically as it gives the impression 
that there is a dual government. Quezon instructed governors and municipal 
presidents in the provinces, under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner for 
Mindanao and Sulu, to deal directly with the people instead of with datus, 
settlers, leaders, or caciques (Barcenas 2000: 139).
Under the independent Philippine administrative structure, the ethnic 
Maranao predominantly inhabit the province of Lanao del Sur and some parts 
of its neighbouring provinces. The provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del 
Norte were established in 1959 by way of Republic Act No. 2228. Marawi 
was designated as the capital of Lanao del Sur. The city was renamed the 
“Islamic City of Marawi” in 1980. By implementing the 1987 Philippine 
Constitutional provision (Art. 10, Sec. 15), the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) was established. In a 1989 plebiscite, Lanao del Sur 
voted to join ARMM, but the people of Marawi City voted not to join. Marawi 
City joined ARMM in 2001 following a plebiscite held after the 1996 Final 
Peace Agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), an armed Muslim rebel group.
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Currently, Lanao del Sur has two congressional districts and 40 
municipalities (including Marawi City). The whole province is headed by 
a duly elected governor while each municipality is led by a mayor. These 
two districts have their respective representatives to the lower house of the 
Philippine congress. Each of 40 municipalities is further subdivided into 
smaller political units called barangay, and are led by an elected chairperson. 
According to Jamel Cayamodin, Lanao del Sur embraces three types of 
political systemthe multiple sultanate system, democratic unitary system, 
and revolutionary Islamic system (Cayamodin 2013: 78). The following 
section deals with the reason why such a multiple political system emerged 
in a modern political system, and how the democratic system was practiced 
within the complex system of Maranao politics.
TRANSFORMING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION IN 
LANAO DEL SUR
Modernists assert that societies always emerge from its traditional beginnings. 
The contrast between traditional and modern social structure has been discussed 
extensively by way of various typologies, such as the status-contract society 
(Sir Henry Maine), kinship-political societies (Vinogradoff), gemeinschaft-
gesellschaft (Toennies), and communal-associational relations (MacIver), 
etc., (Mckinney 1966; Redfield 1947). In the process of modernisation, it is 
natural that the authority system also changes from the traditional to the legal 
one, which affects all other aspects of the social structure (Saber 1967: 210). 
Transplanting the Western democratic system to Lanao came along with 
the conscious efforts to change the local cultures and make it fit the modern 
governmental system. The public school system which used English as a 
medium of instruction was introduced for the younger generation, and Christian 
missionary activities spread around the region. The new administrative 
division imposed upon traditional kinship society restructured the political 
society into a territorial jurisdiction. Local administrators were first appointed 
by the central authority, and later on, the election system was gradually put 
into place to fill the various public positions. These changes happened not 
only in Lanao but also all around the Philippines. However, the impact was 
different because Christianised areas had already been put under a loosely 
centralised governmental system, as well as a limited election system during 
the Spanish colonial period. The Western educational system and Christian 
missionary activities were not entirely foreign to the Christianised Filipinos. 
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However, the Muslim Maranaos had to face a totally new system of 
government. The dominant authority of the appointed or elected public 
officials were superimposed on the traditional elites. Likewise, the role of the 
traditional elites in settling conflicts among their subordinates lost its ground 
due to the establishment of a legal police agency which represented by the 
modern government. In effect, the locus of power shifted from traditional 
leadership composed of the sultans and datus to modern political leadership 
exercised by the legal officials (Benitez 1969: 15). The newly-introduced 
modern institutions could only be perceived by the Maranaos as challenges or 
new opportunities depending on the situation.
The newly-introduced modern system of government operated under 
traditional local culture, which proved inconsistent. Fred Riggs called it a 
“prismatic model of society,” which refers to the “co-existence of traditional 
and modern cultural systems, each with its distinctive norms and practices.” 
Clashes between the traditionalists and modernists, along with organisational 
dysfunction, were expected to occur (Abdulrachman and Makol 2013: 29). 
The case of Lanao also confirms Riggs’ model, as explicated in according 
to various literature. In the process of acculturation, adults were usually too 
late for formal education and training, which compelled them to send their 
youth to modern institution of leaning and acquiring knowledge and power. 
This was the case of many traditional Maranao elites, who prepared their next 
generations to remain in power under the newly-emerging political system 
(Saber 1967: 184). 
Unlike the traditional political system of Lanao where the authority 
was dispersed among various local clan leaders, the new authority system is 
hierarchical, where power emanates from the central government and cascades 
down to the local barangay level. Upon imposing a new rule of the game 
for acquiring political authority, some traditional elites who were receptive 
to the new political environment tried to reinvent themselves to fit into the 
new system. Competitions for the appointed or elected positions among the 
political aspirants become so severe that they utilised whatever means to win. 
The traditional values of unity and cooperation among elites have been replaced 
by competition and rivalry in power (Abdulrachman and Makol 2013: 30). 
New political values and institutions loosened the grip of traditional 
social structures and practices in Lanao.5 The new system also changed the 
most important role of traditional leaders in conflict mediation. The legal 
position provided stronger leverage for conflict mediation. Traditional elites 
began to utilise the modern government apparatus to reinforce their power 
and influence both in the traditional and modern spheres. They coordinated 
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with local government agencies in resolving conflicts and implementing 
government projects and programs. These functions were strengthened 
and became officially legitimised as they assumed political positions in the 
government (Barcenas 2000: 142; Saber 1967: 105). 
As they competed for government positions, the clans also sought the 
support of powerful men outside of their communities, especially prominent 
political figures in Manila. Under such political environment, local political 
aspirants exerted effort to connect with outsiders, that the interest of the 
people from the locality became secondary.6 Due to the centralised political 
system, local politicians played the role of agents who carry out the central 
government’s programs in the region, even if these are contradictory to the 
interests of the locality people. A representative case in the earlier period was 
the facilitation and protection of Christian migrants to the Muslim area. This 
fact engendered increasing distrust of the traditional elites who turned to a 
government officer (Brown 1988: 72). Upon expanding the educational and 
political opportunity to the wider populace, the initial monopoly of political 
power by the traditional elites was increasingly challenged. The most prominent 
figures who challenged the traditional politicians were the scholar groups, the 
ulama, and the youth who had modern higher education.
The ulama groups abhorred not only the traditional elites’ manipulation 
of democratic institutions for their own interests but also the degradation of 
Islamic values by the influence of Westernisation. They believed that politicians 
gave a bad name to Islam and corrupted Muslims, by turning politics into an 
instrument of social degradation, criminality and other un-Islamic acts (Madale 
1998: 19). They tried to find an alternative way from the international Islamic 
reform movement. A group of ulama organised an Islamic reform movement 
called “Kamilol Islam Society”7 in 1936 with the cooperation of some 
traditional elites (Midori 2009: 145). The Islamic social movement gradually 
affected local politics in Lanao. Some Islamic idealists also tried to engage 
in modern politics by running in local elections with Islamic party platforms. 
Examples of this are the Ompia (Reform) Party and the Ulama Party, among 
others (Panda 2009). Aside from them, there were also some people, especially 
the educated youth, who organised militant groups for armed struggle against 
the Philippine government. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Fronts (MILF) are representative cases. Both 
struggled for the establishment of an independent Islamic state at the most, 
or at least, the achievement of meaningful autonomy. Every government of 
the Philippines tried to resolve the armed rebellions through peace talks or 
military campaigns, but the conflict has yet to be settled until today.
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The factors described abovethe inclusion of the Muslim area to the 
Christian dominated Philippines, the imposition of the new political system, 
the Islamic Reform movement, and the outbreak of armed struggleshave 
affected the way of adaptation and transformation of Western democracy in 
Lanao. By examining the historical context and the operational mechanisms 
of the two key institutions of Western democracy in Lanao, the real features 
of localised democracy in Lanao del Sur would be unpacked in the following 
sections.
Elections in Lanao del Sur
When the Americans introduced elections to the Philippines, local elections 
came ahead of national election. The first local election in the Philippines 
under the American rule was the 1900 experimental municipal election which 
covered only a few peaceful barrios. This election triggered the formation of 
modern political parties in the Philippines. The local election for provincial 
governors was held for the first time in 1902, and it covered only 32 of the total 
40 provinces. The first national election for the Philippine National Assembly 
was held in 1907 where suffrage was quite limited;8 Muslims and other non-
Christian tribes were not included. In 1916 the US Congress passed the Jones 
Law (the Philippine Autonomy Act) which provided the basis for delegating 
the entire legislative power to the Filipino. In the 1916 national elections for 
the both chambers of Philippine Congress, Muslims and non-Christian tribes 
were still not allowed to vote. Filipino Muslims were formally included in 
the Philippine local election system from 1932 and the Philippine national 
election system in 1935 (Carlos and Banlaoi 1996: 12–52).
The first local election in Lanao province was the municipal election 
of Dansalan (hereafter, Marawi)9 in 1932. However, the election was stopped 
due to serious quarrels among the mayoralty aspirants, resulting in the death of 
four people. In the end, a non-Maranao, Soriano Dologmandin, was appointed 
mayor (term, 1932–1934), replacing the first appointed major, Bernabe Duran 
(term, 1929–1931). In the following local elections in 1935, incumbent 
Dologmandin won the mayoralty of Marawi. The first national election for 
Congress was held in 1935; a non-Maranao, Tomas Cabili, was elected, and 
served for two terms until 1941. According to Benitez, the elected mayors of 
Marawi mostly came from traditional elites; they were either sons or relatives 
of past and present traditional elite families10 (Benitez 1969: 20–24).
With only a few exceptions, the politics of Lanao has been controlled 
by a few political clansthe Alontos, the Dimaporos, and the Balindongs. 
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Those clans descended from traditional sultans.11 The case of Mahid Mutilan 
was quite exceptional. He did not come from a traditional elite family. He 
hails from a poor family and represents the modern Islamic scholar with B.A. 
in Philosophy and Psychology and PhD in Theology. He founded the Ompia 
Party, basing its creed on Islamic principles and distancing itself from the 
corrupt political behaviour of the traditional elites. He was elected city major 
of Marawi in 1988, and governor of Lanao del Sur for three terms in 1992, 
1995, and 1998. His success was initially possible because of the political 
climate change, brought about by the democratisation of the Philippines 
after the collapse of the 15-year Marcos dictatorship (1971–1986). The new 
political experiment led by the local ulama seemed to earn currency (Panda 
2009). However, it did not take long before the traditional elites were reinstated 
in Lanao politics. In the 2001 local elections, the Alonto clan reclaimed the 
governorship of Lanao del Sur. The Ompia Party was mired in strife and was 
divided into several factions after the sudden death of the leader Mahid Mutilan 
in 2007. The failure of the new political experiments by the local ulama was 
mainly due to the deeply-embedded electoral practices among the Maranaos.
Under the Philippine political context, local politics heavily depended 
on the climates of national politics. The nomination of local candidates 
is usually done by the big men in Manila, mostly party leaders, who are 
capable of mobilising political resources such as network and election fund. 
Consequently, local candidates are encouraged to establish closer relations 
with the big men in order to be assured of party support. It is observed that 
one cannot even become a town mayor without having travelled to Manila, get 
a padrino, and spent so much money (Benitez 1969: 41; Madale 1986: 31). 
According to Maranao lawyer and public officer Sagad Mabaning (interview, 
2 February 2016, Manila), it is still a prerequisite to amass economic resources 
to travel and socialise with the people in Manila when running for office in 
Lanao del Sur.
Once connection with national party leaders is established, candidates 
may start the campaign, mobilising all possible means to win local voters. 
The three G’s (Gold, Goons, Guns) are often mentioned by many scholars as 
integral in Philippine elections. These elements are particularly observable in 
the elections in Lanao del Sur. Maranao scholar Jamel Cayamodin (interview, 
11 August 2016, Manila) reports that in election campaign periods, candidates 
for governorship would call on each municipal leaders to broker deals. 
Candidates and municipal leaders negotiate various deals like how much money 
to give and the benefits in case of winning. A candidate for city or municipality 
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mayorship does the same to each barangay official, and a candidate for the 
barangay chairmanship does the same to each family.
A candidate also uses the system of reciprocity existing between the 
sultans and the followers. Even though traditional titles are only titular in 
the modern political system, the existing kinship makes it still meaningful in 
the political process. The sultans often play the role of patron by attending 
to the needs of the followers. As recipients of favours, the followers in turn 
are expected to support the sultans in whatever occasions. Reciprocity, as it 
operates between the sultans and the followers, is carried over into the political 
sphere. During elections, the sultans are considered political brokers of their 
respective communities. The sultans can easily mobilise the people to support 
any candidate during the election period12 (Benitez 1969: 45; Langco 2014: 
116).
Being political brokers, the sultans decide whom to support. It is also an 
important consideration for them to support the winnable candidate. Once an 
agreement has been brokered, the sultans will mobilise relatives and bargain 
for their votes. Western democracy, which is founded on the rational choice 
of individual citizens, challenges the Maranao democracy, where collective 
rationality overrides individual preference. Adam and Boer described how 
such mechanism is practiced in the case of the municipal elections held in 
2013 in the municipality of Kapatagan: 
Different sub-clans were intensively discussing which candidate 
to support. When a final decision was ultimately made, a so-called 
kanduli (celebration) was organized to state openly support for one 
particular candidate that placed this sub-clan within the coalition 
of the “mother clan.” However, these alliances are never fixed 
and can easily change in the run-up to new elections (Adam and  
Boer 2015: 19). 
Elections among Maranaos are battles that must be won whatever the cost. 
The incumbent officers privately utilise their official powers and prerogatives 
in the election process. This practice contributed in creating political dynasties 
in the Philippines. Lanao is not an exception. Elective positions are inherited 
from father to son or daughter, or husband to wife, and so on. In Lanao del Sur, 
the Alonto-Adiong clan is the strongest political dynasty.13 Political violence 
is often mentioned as commonplace in Philippine elections. ARMM, where 
Lanao de Sur belongs, rates the highest frequency of election-related violence 
(Co et al. 2013: 66). According to Matuan’s study, the six major causes of 
rido (clan conflict) in Lanao del Sur are politics (52 cases), land disputes (45 
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cases), maratabat [clan honor] (28 cases), retaliation (27 cases), accidents (26 
cases), and drug related cases (25 cases). The cases of politics, maratabat, and 
retaliation are more or less related with elections. Election-related conflicts 
tend to escalate into full-blown rido and deaths for many people (Matuan 
2007: 77–79). In Lanao del Sur, elections are scheduled to held regularly.14 
The end of one election means the start of another campaign for the next 
elections. Elections are part of daily existence where friends become enemies 
and enemies friends depending on the political climate (Mednick 1975: 87). 
What is the reason then for the Maranao elites’ obsession in with elective 
positions? In the Western democratic system, an election is a legitimate 
institution where a person of authority is selected. Unlike traditional Lanao 
leadership where inherited authority was widely distributed among community 
leaders, the Western democratic system is designed to organise a centralised 
hierarchical authority system. The higher position holds power and privilege. 
In a study on Marawi elections, Benitez notes that “candidates devise ways 
and means to win the struggle since victory means the enhancement of one’s 
maratabat and enjoyment of power, money, and patronage” (Benitez 1969: 44). 
Mednick also argues that “the Maranao traditional elites vie for government 
posts or ally themselves with office-holders in order to enforce traditional 
authority and outstrip rivals” (Mednick 1975: 87). 
Jamel Cayamodin (interview, 4 August 2016, Manila), notes that Maranaos 
vie for government positions for “money and livelihood.” He reports that the 
“election is nothing but competition to get the Internal Revenue Allotment 
(IRA) and employment opportunities.” Based on the Local Government Code 
of 1991 (RA 7160), the Philippine government allocates the IRA to each Local 
Government Unit (LGU). Some local governments also have additional local 
sources of revenue such as property taxes and government fees. According 
to the financial report of the local government of Lanao de Sur, the IRA is 
pegged at 97.17 percent, 94.97 percent, and 97.81 percent in 2012, 2013, and 
2014 respectively.15 This means that the IRA is the most important source of 
income in Lanao del Sur. It was observed that prior to the granting of IRA 
by virtue of the Local Government Code, few wanted to run for office in the 
barangay level. Since being granted the IRA, rivalries in barangay elections 
intensified, and the number of rido caused by political rivalry significantly 
increased (Matuan 2007: 79).
Adam and Boer (2015) report that in the municipality of Kapatagan, an 
arrangement of blood money payment exists where 50 percent had to be paid 
by the perpetrator and 50 percent by the mediator. This shows that eligible 
leaders must have enough money to mediate the conflicts. Traditionally, 
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sultans and datus played the role of mediator, and they accumulated resources 
from the community land or taxation. However, such privileges were stripped 
under the modern government system. Quite remarkably, 50 percent of the 
blood money is simply understood by the Maranaos as money coming from 
the government, thus directly indicating the close relationship between the 
role of politicians as mediators and the fact that state resources are directly 
used in these practices (Adam and Boer 2015: 24). In the end, the potential 
use of public funds for personal reasons makes elections in Lanao del Sur 
a competition not for leadership in a modern democratic system but for 
paternalistic authority in traditional society.
The Rule of Law in Lanao del Sur
In order for a democratic system to operate effectively, Linz and Stepan 
(1996) emphasised that political power should be exercised according to 
the established procedures and norms. In addition, the system of checks 
and balances among the state, market, and civil society should be worked 
seamlessly. In other words, the Western democratic system could not stand 
alone without the established rule of law, which regulates not only the election 
process but also the exercise of political power.
When conflicts happen in traditional Lanao society, sultans or datus 
played the role of mediator, and judged based on traditional customary laws, 
called taritib. Any important decisions for the community were made with the 
consensus of the elders. In such rural, simple, and self-sufficient society, the 
role of the state represented by the traditional leadership was quite limited, its 
structure and function overlapping without clear distinction. The legitimacy 
of leadership came from the succession rule of taritib, and the exercise of 
power was personal and absolute without any defined accountability. On the 
contrary, the role of elected public officers under the Western democratic 
system is clearly defined by law, and the exercise of power is subject to legal 
and political accountability. In the classic literature on political culture, Pye 
and Verba (1965) classified the former as a parochial political culture and the 
later as participatory political culture. 
In an earlier study about Marawi City politics, Benitez (1969: 34, 57) 
observed that what actually occurred, and still occurs, in the city’s political 
setting was the fusion of democratic political institution with traditional 
institutions and practices. Since most of the elected officials belong to 
respected and influential traditional elite families, their traditional status and 
roles remain in their respective localities. However, due to the inflation of 
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traditional title holders in Lanao, not all sultans are elected. In the Philippine 
legal system, the title of sultan is nothing but “decoration.” The sultan of Tara 
says this: “The power of the sultan is grabbed by the mayors and barangay 
captains. They can give money to the offended party. The people lose their 
confidence in the sultan because we do not have money, can’t solve the 
problems. We lost power and control over people in the barangay” (Adam and 
Boer 2015: 24). This statement from the sultan of Tara’s shows that somehow, 
authority and legitimate power shifted from the dispersed traditional elites to 
the concentrated few legal officials.
Being “sultan-mayor” has become a position of prestige, influence, 
and authority, which combine traditional and legal authorities. No capable 
accountability systems are in place for traditional/legal officials in the Lanao del 
Sur. Parochial political culture common in the rural areas in the Philippines, as 
well as weak state penetration into the Lanao society, have resulted in conflict 
situations. Lanao del Sur is one of the heavily-affected areas by the prolonged 
armed conflicts ever since the Spanish colonial era. After the independence 
of the Philippines, the armed struggle by the well-organised Muslim rebel 
groups in the late 1960’s made the region a conflict zone where the line of 
legal authority is not very clear. In fact, the Philippine National Police is not 
the only rule enforcer in the area; rebel groups also act like quasi-police and 
engage in the public affairs.16
Today, there coexist three different types of laws among the Maranaothe 
traditional taritib, Islamic law, and Philippine law. The traditional taritib are 
still being widely practiced among people as far as family or clan-related 
matters are concerned. Islamic law is officially being implemented through 
the Sharia court, mostly for civil and religious matters. The Philippine law is 
applied to civil, criminal, and administrative matters. The distinction among 
the three justice systems is not very clear, and the rule implementation is not 
unified. Such multifold judicial system contributes to the deterioration of the 
rule of law, and it affects not only the peace and order situation but also the 
operation of democratic institutions such elections and governance.
It is said that the majority of the Maranao do not report the deaths of 
their kin to the Philippine legal authorities. In addition, not a single rido was 
solely resolved by the Philippine legal system. These indicate that the Maranao 
traditional taritib still remains to be a strong and effective means to resolve 
rido (Matuan 2007: 94). One local non-governmental organisation, Rido Inc., 
led by Sultan Abdul Hamidullah “Pogie” T. Atar, argues that the Maranao 
consider these formal institutions as alien and only imposed by a (post)-colonial 
state on a much older cultural tradition and social order which still enjoys 
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high legitimacy among Maranaos (Adam and Boer 2015: 12). In an interview, 
Sultan Pogie (interview, 10 February 2015, Marawi City) lamented the lawless 
situation among the Maranaos. He conveys the following: “statistics indicate 
that the casualties of the armed conflicts have reached 120,000. However, 
other data tells us that the incidents of rido are indirectly related with the 
conflict situation, the unstable judicial system, prevalent poverty, and many 
others. The main reason for this is the lack of a system for conflict resolution.”
In the Western democratic system, elections are deemed most important 
as a way to place political accountability on elected officials. The strict and 
unbiased implementation of the rule of law is an important means to secure 
clean and fair elections. When such conditions are not fulfilled, the political 
accountability system fails to function and finds itself compromised. Maranao 
scholar and politician Armin Barra reports that various malpractices plague 
Maranao elections, from voter registration up to the vote counting. These include 
multiple voting (where paid voters are popularly called “flying voters”), vote-
buying, and other violations by the election camps. By experience, Maranaos 
believe that the IRA would not be spent for its rightful purposes, only to be 
misappropriated by public officials. Another Maranao scholar, Ali Panda, 
argues that voters justify accepting money from the candidates, particularly 
those in power, since the money is from public funds anyway that were never 
used for the improvement of the city, municipality, or province. They see 
nothing wrong with this. In addition, the constituencies also receive money 
from other candidates because once they get elected, they will also do the 
same. Such belief makes vote-buying and selling a standard practice among 
the Maranaos (Panda 2009: 69). 
When it comes to the legal aspect of accountability, the weak Philippine 
judicial system makes legal protests for electoral fraud or cases against the 
breach of public authority totally useless. There are some indications that 
show the low rating of the Philippine accountability system. The corruption 
perception index from the Transparency International shows that the Philippine 
ranks 134 out of 178 sample states in 2010. The voice and accountability 
index of the World Governance Indicators by the World Bank shows that the 
Philippines maintained a 40 percent to 60 percent downward trend from 1996–
2009. The rule of law index from the World Justice Project shows that the 
Philippines ranks 8 to 12 out of 13 Asia-Pacific countries in every indicators.17 
Ali Panda observes that Maranao candidates know that money counts in 
charges of election fraud and irregularities. Contenders usually receive the 
final decision coming from the Supreme Court when the next election is just 
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around the corner (Panda 2009: 70). Under such a weak and slow judicial 
system, elections have become a battleground for privileges and power. 
Today’s unstable rule of law condition in Lanao del Sur could be a 
side effect of the aforementioned cultural transmission from the outside world. 
Integration programs introduced by Americans, and much later, the Philippine 
government, were not completely embraced. This created a setback. The 
cultural incompatibility deepened the frustration of some sectors of the local 
populace, which resulted in prolonged armed conflicts. The conflict situation 
again diminished the power of state penetration in Maranao society. Due to 
the incompetent national judicial system, local customary and religious laws 
remained in effect among the Maranaos. Also, the multifold judicial system 
could not provide a solid foundation for the Western democratic system to 
operate as it is designed to be, but it provided participants with many loopholes 
to play around.
CONCLUSION: HYBRIDISATION OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY
When the West became a dominant power of the world, its ideology and culture 
spread abroad in the name of Westernisation or modernisation. Democracy as 
a system of government is an integral part of the Westernisation. The basic 
principles of democracy were formed based on Western individualism and 
rationality, etc. However, when democracy was transplanted to non-Western 
contexts, it did not thrive in many different cultural soils. Some democracies 
gave way to dictatorships, or created hybrid forms of government by 
accommodating the local culture. Various factors may affect the success or 
failure of adapting and assimilating the democratic system.
The transplantation of the Western democratic system in the Philippines 
was a modernisation project by the Americans. Modernisation theory predicts 
that traditional society will eventually give way to a modern-legal society 
(Mckinney 1966; Redfield 1947). However, as Abdulrachman and Makol 
(2013: 20) argue, the process of cultural change does not occur overnight. 
It entails a long process of acculturation, assimilation, and adoption. In the 
long run, many elements in the culture will resist the changes. There are some 
elements of indigenous culture that resist the influence of newly-introduced 
foreign cultures. If the beliefs and practices from the outside world are adopted 
in full scale, then, traditional practice would be replaced. But if it is adopted 
partially, it would result to a hybrid one. 
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In the case of Lanao del Sur, Western democracy was introduced not 
by the will of the locals but by external forces. The adaptation of Western 
democracy also came along with its integration to the bigger Christian-
dominated polity as a cultural minority group. This shows that Maranao politics 
has become heavily dependent on external factors. Under the new political 
environment, locals began to perceive the local power elites’ behaviour and 
the national policies as pushing them to a corner. Such perception provides 
space for resistance. Sporadic armed conflicts not only deterred social and 
cultural exchanges with the outside world, but also weakened the penetration 
of state authority onto the local. All of these conditions affected the practice of 
democratic institutions in Lanao del Sur. 
The traditional authority system with collective identities is still 
functioning in the process of elections. The benefits of electoral victory are 
shared by families and clans which supported the winning candidate. The 
power and privileges of the elected officials are not much different from those 
of the traditional rulers. The weak system of the rule of law, whether caused by 
the strong local tradition or the weak state power of law implementation, makes 
election campaigns a lawless battle among competing parties. Due to the weak 
judicial system, elections do not function as a means of political accountability, 
and elected officials wield almost absolute power in their constituencies. As 
much as the traditional elements affect the democratic system, the traditional 
elites, who shrewdly adapted themselves into new political environment, are 
the major players of the local power struggle.
In fact, the introduction of Western democratic system to the Maranao 
changed the system of authority from the traditional to the legal one. Democratic 
institutions operate on a regular basis. But practices are very different. Elections 
and the rule of law are observed only superficially. The traditional conception 
of social relations and authority still shape the democratic system in Lanao 
del Sur. Various factors contributed to the hybrid characteristics of democracy 
in Lanao del Sur. The unsettled peace and order situation and the economic 
underdevelopment may be easily mentioned. It is also true that such social and 
economic conditions could be the side effects of the process of transplanting a 
Western democratic system to the incongruent cultural terrain. 
From a regional perspective, the Maranao case is not at all unique in 
Southeast Asia. Southeast Asians have absorbed outer civilisations throughout 
history, but the adoption process was not a dogmatic but more eclectic. This 
tendency has been witnessed in the way some cultures embraced Chinese 
Confucianism without gender discrimination and Indic Hinduism without the 
caste system. Western democracy that transplanted to Lanao del Sur could not 
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take root and grow as it intended. The reasons could be found in the context 
that it was transplanted and the embedded local culture. In this respect, our 
understanding on the democracies in Southeast Asia needs to be based on the 
local cultural contexts.
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1 The emergence of powerful sultanates was closely related to access to political resources. 
Magindanao sultans exploited the strategic location at the confluence of riverine travel routes, 
where they could extract from passing traders the surpluses necessary to finance military 
strength and hold surrounding regions in tributary relationships. The Tausug sultans of the 
Sulu archipelago exploited a concentration of interisland trade routes for similar purposes (See 
Bentley 1984).
2 Earlier writings (Goodenough 1955; Saber 1975; Warriner 1964) treated agama and not inged 
as the main political entity. Scholars wrote that the agama had a set of offices, and attended 
gatherings where they facilitate or make decisions. They follow established procedures for 
decision-making and taking action. Differences have been noted as the traditional administrative 
structure was expanded in time.
3 The Jones Law, also known as the Philippine Autonomy Act, was an organic act passed by the 
US Congress. The law replaced the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 and acted as a constitution 
of the Philippines from its enactment until 1934. The Jones Law created the first fully-elected 
Philippine legislature.
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4 The Commonwealth of the Philippines was established through the Tydings-McDuffie Act 
of the United States Congress. It was designed as a transitional government for 10 years, in 
preparation for the country’s full achievement of independence.
5 An example could be found in the case the sultan of Lanao, Bernabe Duran who was a non-
Maranao and the first appointed Marawi mayor (term, 1929–1931). The sultan of Lanao was a 
new self-made title by the incumbent mayor, which has no basis in the tradition of the taritib 
that does not permit any person to a title that collects overall power and influence over the 
entire pangampong organisation. The person who created the title for himself gained such 
influence as a government official that his followers also recognised his self-made title despite 
the resentment of other sultans and datus (Saber 1967: 157–158).
6 Many interviewees like Dr. Armin Barra, Dr. Ali B. Panda, among others (interview, 29−31 
July 2014, Marawi City), lamented such practice of Lanao politics.
7 The society follows universal Islam principles rather than the indigenous Muslim culture of the 
Maranao. The activities constituted a response to the “civilisation policy” imposed by American 
colonial authorities on the Muslim community of the Philippines, in the form of resistance (see 
more details in Midori 2009: 149–50).
8 Suffrage was given only provided to males aged 21 years old and above, residing for six months 
in their districts, had other qualifications such as holding office prior to 13 August 1898, owned 
real property worth at least P 500, and could read, write or speak English or Spanish (Carlos 
and Banlaoi 1996: 18).
9 The Americans developed Dansalan as the centre of colonial administration in Lanao, which 
renamed Marawi (currently the Islamic City of Marawi) and later became the capital city of 
Lanao de Sur.
10 The category of “traditional leader” in the context of Lanao del Sur is subject to huge inflation 
and may not reveal that much about the actual social position of a person in a certain community 
(Adam and Boer 2015: 11).
11 The Alonto clan descends from the Sultan of Bayabao, the Dimaporo clan from the Sultan of 
Royale House of Masiu, and the Balindong clan to Sultan Amer Macaorao Balindong.
12 Each person who claims membership in one agama believes that he has a right to vote there, 
no matter where he lives. Thus, on election day, there is much traveling around as each seek to 
vote in each agama (Warriner 1975: 78).
13 The most notable members of the Alonto-Adiong clan are the following: Alauya Adiong Alonto, 
the first Muslim Senator and signatory to the 1935 Constitution; Datu Birua Alonto, mayor of 
Marawi City in 1938; Domocao Alangadi Alonto, governor, congressman, and senator from 
1958 to 1961; Abdul Ghaffur Alonto, governor of Lanao del Sur for two terms from 1960 to 
1967; Princess Tarhata Alonto-Lucman, governor, Lanao del Sur from 1970 to 1988; Rashid 
Lucman, congressman; Mamintal Adiong, congressman and governor, Lanao del Sur; Abul 
Khayr Alonto, Speaker, ARMM; Ansaruddin Alonto Adiong, Assemblyman and Regional 
Governor, ARMM; Mamintal Alonto Adiong Jr., governor, Lanao del Sur from 2007 to 2016.
14 Various elections come one after another. These are: (1) national and local elections for 
President, Vice President, senators, congressmen, governors and mayors; (2) elections for 
barangay officials, (3) elections for ARMM governor, vice governor and assemblymen, and 
(4) the mid (presidential) term elections for congressmen, provincial, and municipal officials.
15 Typically for municipalities, the IRA accounts for 90 percent of total revenues. Since cities have 
more sources of local revenues, IRA ranges from 50 percent to 70 percent of their total budget. 
The figures are from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_Revenue_Allotment (accessed 1 
September 2016).
16 During the field work in Lanao del Sur, the author encountered several check points controlled 
by armed rebel groups. He also had a chance to talk with an MILF member assigned in an 
establishment in Marawi City as a security chief (interview, 2 August 2014, Marawi City). 
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17 The data were excerpted from the websites of the respective institutes: Transparency 
International (Transparency.org), World Bank (GovIndicators.org), and World Justice Project 
(WorldJusticeProject.org). 
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